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BIVENS AND THE ANCIEN R ÉGIME
Carlos M. Vázquez*
INTRODUCTION
In its most recent decision narrowly construing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1 the Supreme Court derided Bivens
as the product of an “ ‘ancien regime,’ . . . [in which] the Court assumed it to
be a proper judicial function to ‘provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective’ a statute’s purpose.”2 In the context of statutorily created
rights, the Court has rejected this ancien régime on the ground that it reflects
a mistaken understanding of the nature of the legislative process. As the
Court wrote in Hernández v. Mesa:
[W]hen a court recognizes an implied claim for damages on the ground that
doing so furthers the “purpose” of the law, the court risks arrogating legislative power. No law “‘pursues its purposes at all costs.’” Instead, lawmaking
involves balancing interests and often demands compromise. Thus, a lawmaking body that enacts a provision that creates a right or prohibits specified conduct may not wish to pursue the provision’s purpose to the extent of
authorizing private suits for damages.3

The Court’s decision in Hernández was based on the view that these considerations also apply with respect to damage remedies for constitutional
violations.
This Essay considers the relevance for Bivens claims of the Court’s shift
to a nouveau régime to address the implication of private rights of action
under statutes. Part I describes and assesses the Court’s reasons for shifting
to the nouveau régime in the statutory context. Part II explains why the
Court’s shift to a nouveau régime for implying damage remedies under federal
statutes does not justify a similar shift with respect to constitutional remedies.
© 2021 Carlos M. Vázquez. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am
grateful to Yuki Segawa for helpful research assistance.
1 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741 (2020) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1855 (2017)).
3 Id. at 741–42 (first quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234
(2013); and then citing Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1986)).
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The Constitution’s omission of specific remedies for violation of the Constitution’s substantive provisions does not reflect the Founders’ belief that such
remedies are unnecessary to give efficacy to those provisions, or that those
provisions should be of only limited efficacy. The Constitution was adopted
against the background of an ongoing system of common-law remedies, and
the Founders understood that such remedies would be available to victims of
constitutional violations. This Essay explains why this ancien régime of common-law remedies for constitutional violations retains considerable relevance
to the current status and scope of Bivens remedies.
For most of our history, these remedies were regarded as neither federal
law nor state law; they were understood to be part of the general common
law. When the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins eliminated this inbetween category of law, the courts without discussion came to regard the
common-law remedies as state-law remedies and, in Bivens, the Court recognized a supplemental federal remedy. Congress subsequently preempted
state-law remedies against federal officials, preserving only the Bivens remedy.
The Court, in turn, has been chipping away at Bivens on the ground that it
constitutes improper judicial lawmaking. These developments risk leaving us
with a remedial regime far narrower than that which had prevailed for most
of our history. This Essay argues that the federal damage remedy recognized
in Bivens could have been framed—and should now be understood—as the
post-Erie manifestation of the general common-law remedial regime that prevailed since the Founding. The existence of these remedies, as supplemented by Bivens, has until now obviated substantial constitutional questions
about the remedies necessary to give efficacy to the constitutional obligations
of federal officials. Any further narrowing of Bivens would require the Court
to confront these long-dormant questions.
I.

THE NOUVEAU RÉGIME

IN THE

STATUTORY CONTEXT

As Justice Alito’s opinion in Hernández makes clear, the nouveau régime
regarding implied statutory rights of action is based on the insight that legislation does not reflect a single legislative purpose but is instead the product
of a compromise among competing interests. This insight undergirds a principal critique of purposive statutory interpretation advanced by so-called
“new textualists.”
[T]he framing of statutory policy entails not merely the articulation of legislative purposes, but also the specification of the means for carrying out those
purposes. Since the choice of means may be the product of hard-fought
legislative compromise, textualists argued that abstracting from a statute’s
textual details to the broader purposes behind them “dishonors the legislative choice as effectively as expressly refusing to follow the law.”4
4 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 654 (7th ed. 2015)
(quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court
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The Court has applied this critique with particular intensity to the question
of implied statutory remedies. “[A] statute is often the product of a pitched
battle between competing interest groups, one outcome of which may be a
compromise that the available remedies would be limited—that full compliance was neither desired nor desirable.”5 The insight that lawmaking is a
matter of compromise, and that the legislative compromise is sometimes
reflected in a statute’s withholding of certain enforcement mechanisms,
eventually led the Court to fashion a self-consciously novel approach to the
implication of private rights of action under statutes. The receptive
approach to inferring rights of action reflected in cases like J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak6 was replaced by the stringent approach to the issue reflected in cases
like Alexander v. Sandoval.7 Recognizing rights of action not explicitly in the
statute, the Court now believes, is a usurpation of legislative power.8
Whether the Court’s insight about the legislative process warranted a
shift of approach on the question of inferring rights of action under statutes
is debatable. Whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately a
question of statutory interpretation.9 Congress enacts statutes against the
background of past judicial decisions concerning how statutes are to be interpreted.10 While the Court adhered to the Borak approach, that approach
provided the background against which Congress enacted statutes that did
not expressly provide a damage remedy. Congress can be presumed to have
enacted such statutes with the understanding that the courts would construe
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16–17 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Foreword]; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 7 (2001); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2390 (2003); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 102–05 (2006).
5 FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 742 (emphasis omitted) (citing Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 4, at 45–51).
6 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
7 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
8 See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741–42; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (“Like substantive
federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
Congress.”).
9 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (“The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a
private remedy.”); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady
Days,” 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 513, 521 (“[W]hatever the merits of Sandoval’s approach . . .
the crux of the dispute between the majority and the dissenters—and between more recent
and older case law—boils down to methodological disagreements over statutory interpretation. There is simply no dispute today that congressional intent is dispositive when it
comes to the existence of a private cause of action to enforce a federal statute . . . .”).
Professor Vladeck points out that, unlike statutory causes of action, “the existence of a
Bivens remedy in no way required indicia of legislative intent.” Id. at 519. For this reason,
he argues that “reading these two lines of cases together distorts the fundamentally distinct
considerations that animate them and thereby risks obscuring the critical constitutional
questions lurking in Bivens’ background.” Id. at 514.
10 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL507.txt

1926

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

4-MAY-21

17:09

[vol. 96:5

them to authorize damage remedies in the circumstances contemplated by
Borak. It is thus unclear how deference to the legislature justified Congress’s
replacement of the Borak background rule of interpretation with the Sandoval background rule of interpretation. Indeed, if applied retroactively, the
shift in interpretive approach would appear to thwart the apparent intent of
a Congress that legislated against the background of the Borak rule. If
applied prospectively, a shift to a new background rule construing legislative
silence as reflecting the absence of a damage remedy might be justified
instead as, for example, a deliberation-forcing penalty default rule, but such
rules succeed at forcing deliberation because they set as the default the result
the legislators are least likely to have wanted.11 Interpretive presumptions are
supposed to provide “a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”12 Any shift in such presumptions would appear
to require a special justification, and such justifications would have to be
grounded in considerations other than deference to the legislature.
In any event, shifting to a new interpretive presumption in the statutory
context entails limited costs, particularly if the new presumption is only
applied prospectively. A presumption against inferring remedies places the
burden of inertia on those who wish to create remedies, but the legislature
can be expected to adjust to whichever presumption the Court imposes. The
same cannot be said of a presumption disfavoring remedies for constitutional
violations.
II.

THE NOUVEAU RÉGIME

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES

Even if the Court’s insight that statutes are typically the product of compromise did justify its rejection of the ancien régime in the context of statutory
remedies, it would not justify application of the nouveau régime to the question of remedies for constitutional violations. The inapplicability of the
nouveau régime to the question of remedies for constitutional violations, was,
indeed, acknowledged from its inception. If Sandoval reflects the triumph of
the nouveau régime, then Justice Powell was that regime’s Rousseau.13 His
dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago laid the groundwork for
the regime that ultimately prevailed.14 In that opinion, Justice Powell clearly
recognized that the new approach he favored for inferring rights of action
under statutes had no applicability to the question of constitutional remedies. “[T]his Court’s traditional responsibility to safeguard constitutionally
protected rights,” Justice Powell wrote, “as well as the freer hand we necessarily have in the interpretation of the Constitution, permits greater judicial
creativity with respect to implied constitutional causes of action.”15 Beyond
11 See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 848 (2006).
12 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
13 See Jack R. Censer, Intellectual History and the Causes of the French Revolution, 52 J. SOC.
HIST. 545, 546 (2019) (discussing Rousseau’s influence on the French Revolution).
14 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 733 n.3.
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4-MAY-21

17:09

1927

these structural points, which echo points made by Justice Harlan in Bivens
and are discussed further below, Justice Powell directly contradicted Justice
Alito’s claim that inferring a damage remedy for violation of the Constitution
would be inconsistent with the understanding of the legislative process that
underlies the nouveau régime: “[T]he implication of remedies to enforce constitutional provisions,” Justice Powell wrote, “does not interfere with the legislative
process in the way that the implication of remedies from statutes can.”16
This Essay argues that the Court’s reasons for rejecting the ancien régime
for inferring remedies from statutes affirmatively supports the opposite
approach with respect to constitutional remedies. For starters, the rights-creating provisions of our Constitution were adopted many years ago, during the
reign of a remedial regime that was decidedly ancien. The Court has been
forthright in recognizing that its current approach to implying remedies
under statutes reflects a sharp shift from its prior approach.17 To apply this
new approach to constitutional provisions adopted centuries ago is decidedly
anachronistic.18
It is true that the Constitution was itself the product of compromise.
Think of the Madisonian Compromise,19 or the notorious Three-Fifths Compromise.20 But these compromises related to the Constitution’s substantive
provisions. It is implausible to claim that, when the Founders adopted the
Bill of Rights without expressly providing for a damage remedy for violation
of those provisions, they were calibrating the degree of effectiveness they
wanted those provisions to have. Their omission of particular remedies does
not reflect their determination that the underlying rights be only partially
effective. We usually assume that the Founders intended the rights guaranteed by those constitutional provisions to be generally effective.21 It is noteworthy that the institution of judicial review also does not expressly appear in
the constitutional text, yet the Court has had no trouble inferring it from the
constitutional structure. Indeed, despite the Constitution’s silence on judicial review, Thomas Jefferson famously defended the addition of a Bill of

16 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Indeed, this was Justice Alito’s point in Hernández.
18 Cf. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020) (“We cannot manufacture a new
presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted 27 years ago.”); cf.
also id. at 490 (relying on the “legal ‘backdrop against which Congress enacted’ [a statute]
to confirm[ ] the propriety of individual-capacity suits.” (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr.
Co., 543 U.S. 481, 487 (2005))).
19 See James E. Pfander, Essay, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 207–12 (2007) (describing the Madisonian Compromise).
20 See Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall’s Thesis on the Intent of a
Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 104–13 (1989) (describing the Three-Fifths
Clause).
21 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–91 (1991).
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Rights to the Constitution because of “the legal check which it puts in the
hands of the judiciary.”22
The Framers’ expectations regarding the remedies that would be available to give efficacy to the constitutional rights they were adopting can be
gleaned from the British history of subjecting government officials exceeding
their powers to common-law remedies.23 The Framers adopted the Constitution’s rights-conferring provisions against the background of an existing system of remedies under the common law and equity. From the beginning of
our history, damages were available against federal officials who violated the
Constitution via common-law claims.24 As many scholars have detailed, victims of constitutional violations could bring common-law claims, such as trespass, against federal (and state) officials.25 The official could be expected to
defend on the ground that she was lawfully enforcing the law. The Constitution would then come in by way of replication to nullify the defense of official
authority. As the Court put it in Ex parte Young in explaining why claims
against state officials are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the constitutional violation “strip[s] [the official] of his official or representative character and [he] is subjected in his person to the consequences of his

22 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788,
at 445 (2010) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in
1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES
MADISON, 1776–1826, at 586, 587 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995)); see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 306, 309,
323–24 (1996).
23 As James Iredell noted in the North Carolina ratification debates, the British notion
that “the king could do no wrong” was understood to mean that the King’s advisers “should
be personally responsible” for their advice. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE
MAKINGS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 374 (2016) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 109 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed. Washington 1836) (remarks of Mr. Iredell)).
24 See Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020) (“In the early Republic, ‘an array of
writs . . . allowed individuals to test the legality of government conduct by filing suit against
government officials’ for money damages ‘payable by the officer.’ These common-law
causes of action remained available through the 19th century and into the 20th.” (alteration in original) (quoting James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862, 1871–75 (2010))).
25 See, e.g., Gregory Sisk, Recovering the Tort Remedy for Federal Official Wrongdoing, 96
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1789, 1792–93 (2021) (noting that courts held officers accountable
under common law in the early days of the American republic); Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Inconsistent Originalism of Judge-Made Remedies Against Federal Officers, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1869, 1880 (2021) (“Suffice it to say, ‘[a]t the Founding, and for much of American history, there was no question as to whether federal courts had the power to provide judgemade damages remedies against individual federal officers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of Bivens, 2019–2020 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 263, 267)).
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individual conduct.”26 Although Young involved prospective injunctive
relief, the same theory was relied on in many cases to enable victims of constitutional violations to common-law damage remedies.27
Justice Alito in Hernández acknowledged these historical precedents for
damage relief against federal officials under the common law, but he
rejected the argument that the federal courts should, by analogy, be understood to have a common-law authority to recognize new federal remedies for
constitutional violations.28 According to the Court, “Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
. . . held that ‘[t]here is no federal general common law,’ and therefore federal courts today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could before
1938.”29
But the majority in Hernández missed the true significance of the ancien
régime. This history is not relevant because it supports an analogous federal
judicial power to create damage remedies in a common-law fashion. Rather,
this history is important because it reflects the understanding when the Constitution was ratified, and subsisting long thereafter, that damages were an
appropriate remedy for constitutional violations by federal (and state) officials.30 The availability of such remedies was the background against which
the relevant constitutional provisions were adopted. The remedy of damages
for constitutional violations was an existing remedy, not a “new claim” (to use
Justice Alito’s term) created by the federal judiciary in Bivens.
A.

The Ancien Régime as General Common Law

It is true that, before Erie, these remedies were understood to be based
on the general common law, and after Erie, we no longer believe in the general common law. What we once considered to be general common law we
now ordinarily regard as state law. Consistent with this view, the pre-Bivens
common-law remedies against federal officials who violate the Constitution
came to be regarded, post-Erie, as state-law remedies.31 When Bivens came to
the Court, the issue was framed as whether the common-law trespass remedy
26 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (“If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to
enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in
that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct.”).
27 See generally Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 YALE. L.J. 77 (1997).
28 See Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (“Analogizing Bivens to the work
of a common-law court, petitioners and some of their amici make much of the fact that
common-law claims against federal officers for intentional torts were once available.”).
29 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938)).
30 Cf. Tanzir v.Tanvir, 141 S.Ct. 486, 491 (2020) (relying on historical availability of
damage relief against government officials in concluding that damage remedies are
“appropriate relief” under RFRA).
31 See Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature
of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 517 (2013).
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should be supplemented by a federal damage remedy. The Court did recognize a supplemental federal remedy and, after initially expanding it, the
Court shifted to its current more hostile approach to Bivens. At first, the
Bivens remedy coexisted with the common-law remedies, but, in the Westfall
Act, Congress eliminated state-law remedies against federal officials, preserving only the Bivens remedy.32
The fact that the rights-conferring provisions of the Constitution were
adopted during the ancien régime has obvious relevance to the Bivens question. This regime of common-law remedies is the ancien régime against which
the Constitution’s rights-conferring provisions were enacted. As President
Nixon’s Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, argued in Bivens itself, the “plan
envisaged when the Bill of Rights was passed” was that a person injured by a
constitutional violation “may proceed . . . by a suit at common law . . . for
damages for the illegal act.”33 The Framers’ failure to include an explicit
right to damages in the Constitution thus does not imply that the Framers
thought the Bill of Rights would be efficacious without damage remedies or
that the Framers desired a less-than-efficacious Constitution, as Justice Alito’s
analysis in Hernández suggests might be true for statutes that do not explicitly
authorize damage remedies.34
Solicitor General Griswold was relying on the existence of common-law
remedies as a reason not to recognize a supplemental federal right of
action.35 The Court rejected his argument and did recognize a supplemental federal right of action. Perhaps because the Court was rejecting the argument that common-law remedies for constitutional violations should remain
the exclusive remedy (in the absence of congressional action), the Court did
not rely on the long pre-Bivens history of awarding damages on a commonlaw theory as an affirmative basis for recognizing the federal damage remedy.
Its focus was instead on the many reasons for departing from a regime in
which the damage remedy for constitutional violations by federal officials

32 The Westfall Act exempts not just Bivens actions but all suits “brought for a violation
of the Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2018), which appears to include the preexisting common-law remedies for constitutional violations. Stephen Vladeck and I have
argued that the Westfall Act should be interpreted to preserve common-law remedies for
constitutional violations by federal officials. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 514.
Without considering this possibility, however, the Court appears to have interpreted the
Westfall Act to preclude all damage remedies against federal officials other than Bivens
claims. Id. at 515. Cf. Tanzin, 141 S. Ct. at 491 (noting that “the Westfall Act foreclosed
common-law claims for damages against federal officials, but it left open claims for constitutional violations and certain statutory violations” (citation omitted)).
33 Brief for Respondents, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 116900, at *10 (quoting Slocum v.
Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1817) (second alteration in original)).
34 Hernández v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741–42 (2020).
35 Brief for Respondents, supra note 33, at *10–12.
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would have its basis in state law.36 The Court had good reasons to depart
from that model, but its argument would have been less vulnerable to the
“judicial usurpation” critique if the Court had stressed its continuity with the
ancien régime. The Court could and should have presented the federal right
of action it recognized in Bivens as the post-Erie manifestation of the pre-Erie
general common-law regime that all parties then accepted as consistent with
the original understanding.37
The Court’s recognition of a federal damage remedy in Bivens appeared
discontinuous with past practice because the pre-Bivens right of action was
thought to be based on state law. But the understanding that the commonlaw damage remedy was a state-law remedy was itself only of recent vintage.
Before the Court’s decision in Erie, the common-law remedy was understood
to be based on the general common law.38 The general common law, in
turn, resembled post-Erie state law in some respects, but it resembled postErie federal law in other respects. It was neither state nor federal law.
The general law resembled federal law in that its content was not understood to depend on state judicial decisions interpreting it. The general common law was thought to have an existence independent of state or federal
judicial decisions, and the federal courts were thought to be as capable of
discovering it as were the state courts. The general common law was believed
to be a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,” as Justice Holmes derisively but
accurately described the pre-Erie understanding.39 The federal courts
accordingly used their independent judgment in applying the general common law. In other respects, however, the general common law resembled
current-day state law. First, the federal courts’ interpretation of such law was
not binding on the state courts, and the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction
to review the state courts’ interpretation of such law.40 Second, the general
common law was subject to alteration by state legislatures.41
It is thus fair to describe the general common law, as enforced in the
pre-Erie era, as having an “in-between” status. It was neither federal law nor
state law. It had features of both. Erie held that this in-between status no
longer existed. After Erie, therefore, the question for the federal courts, with
respect to the general common law as applied in discrete contexts, was
whether to upgrade the law’s status to federal law or to downgrade it to state
law. Because the in-between status was no longer available, the courts had to
adjust its status up (to federal-law status) or adjust it down (to state-law status).
36 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394 (“The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass
and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”).
37 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 541.
38 Id. at 539.
39 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517, 1527, 1560 (1984).
41 See id. at 1560, 1558–62 (“An obvious weakness of the federal system was the ability
of the state legislatures to provide by statute a rule of law different from that provided by
the [general] common law.”).
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In most contexts, the general common law was properly downgraded to
state-law status. The federal government is one of limited and specified powers. Its powers do not encompass all areas covered by the general common
law. Moreover, the Constitution specifies how preemptive federal law is to be
made—through bicameralism and presentment (for statutes) or by negotiation with another country and the consent of two-thirds of the Senate (for
treaties). Treating the general common law as federal law would have circumvented the carefully wrought procedure the Founders adopted for enacting preemptive federal law.
But, even after Erie, the Court recognized that federal common law
would govern in certain areas. On the same day it decided Erie, for example,
the Court decided that interstate disputes would be governed by federal common law.42 After Erie, the Court faced the choice of whether to downgrade
the ancien régime of remedies for violations of the Constitution from generallaw status to state-law status, or to upgrade it to federal-law status, as it found
appropriate in certain discrete areas. Initially, and without analysis, the
courts assumed that the ancien régime of remedies for constitutional violations
had been downgraded, along with the rest of the general common law.43 For
this reason, the question as formulated in the Bivens case was whether to
recognize a supplementary federal remedy. The Court could have formulated the question instead as whether the ancien régime of common-law remedies for violation of the Constitution should be upgraded, post-Erie, to
federal-law status. Bivens’s trajectory would likely have been very different
had the Court posed the issue that way, as it would have underscored Bivens’s
continuity with the past. Instead, the Court came to treat the Bivens decision,
inaccurately, as an exercise of raw judicial lawmaking. As discussed in Section II.B, there were strong reasons for upgrading the status of this remedial
regime to federal-law status. In retrospect, Bivens should be understood as
having belatedly upgraded and updated the ancien régime of common-law
remedies for constitutional violations to federal-law status.
B.

Reasons to Upgrade the Ancien Régime

The literature on the legitimacy of federal common law is legion, and
the Court has not been consistent in its approach to the topic. But it is fair to
say that two important considerations are (a) whether the matter is of special
concern to the federal government and (b) whether there is a special reason
not to await federal legislative action.44 It is clear that both considerations
42 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
43 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 541–42, 542 n.165 (noting that, after Erie,
“the pre-existing common law remedies were assumed to be state law remedies” and citing
federal court decisions).
44 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp. 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[W]e have held that a
few areas, involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so committed by the Constitution and
laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced,
where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive)
by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’” (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
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supported upgrading the damage remedy against federal officials who violate
the federal Constitution to federal-law status.
The special federal interest in the question of damage remedies against
federal officials who violate the Constitution is obvious. The job of federal
officials is to make sure that federal law is faithfully enforced. The Court has
recognized the existence of a special federal interest in this topic by recognizing a federal common-law doctrine limiting the availability of damages against
such officials. For example, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Court
noted that one of the areas in that it had “found to be of peculiarly federal
concern, warranting the displacement of state law, is the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty. We have held in
many contexts that the scope of that liability is controlled by federal law.”45
The Court in Boyle relied on the existence of this interest in extending the
immunity to federal government contractors.
There are two structural arguments against awaiting action by Congress.
The first is a broad argument that would apply to any matter of special federal interest that was previously addressed through the general common law.
The Founders intentionally made federal legislation difficult. As Professor
Clark has explained, the Founders made the federal legislative process especially onerous in order to safeguard the interests of the states.46 With respect
to subjects that do not present special federal interests, the Constitution’s
tilting of the scales against federal preemption of state law is perhaps justifiable.47 But, on matters of particular federal interest, the Court’s elimination
of this in-between category of law should not lead inexorably to a downgrading of the relevant law to state-law status. A special federal interest should
suffice to justify an upgrading of the relevant law to federal status. Otherwise, the special federal interests that, before Erie, were adequately protected
via the general common law would be sacrificed because of the obstacles the
Founders established to protect state interests in other contexts.
This argument is particularly compelling where the interests involved
were largely protected in the pre-Erie era through broad grants of federal
jurisdiction. During this period, most cases involving the general common
law were adjudicated in the state courts. Federal jurisdiction over such cases
depended on the fortuity of diversity. The proportion of common-law cases
in the federal courts compared to those in the state courts was undoubtedly
very low. Common-law claims against federal officials, on the other hand, were
adjudicated overwhelmingly in the federal courts, as most federal officials
Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981))); id. (rejecting “[p]etitioner’s broadest contention” that the absence of legislation creating the government contractor defense means
that the Court cannot recognize the defense under federal common law).
45 Id. at 505.
46 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1328–29 (2001).
47 But see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2008).
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had the right to remove such cases from state to federal courts.48 Thus, in
most cases against federal officials, the federal court would have interpreted
and applied the general common-law remedies without regard to the decisions of the state courts. For the same reason, the fact that state courts were
not bound by federal interpretations of the general common law, and that
state court decisions based on general common law were not appealable to
the Supreme Court, was far less significant, as these suits would mostly have
been adjudicated in federal courts to begin with. Thus, the pre-Erie regime
of common-law remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials was
much closer to a post-Erie regime that regards such remedies as having a
federal-law status than a post-Erie regime that regards them as having a statelaw status. The broad availability of federal jurisdiction meant that these
claims would have been adjudicated by federal courts that did not regard
themselves as bound by state-law precedents.49
The argument that a special federal interest should suffice to upgrade
the general common law to federal-law status is subject to the counterargument that, if the special interest is so strong and so clear, we can expect
Congress to overcome the obstacles the Constitution imposes for federal lawmaking.50 This counterargument has rarely carried the day in the Supreme
Court, however.51 In any event, in the case of damage remedies against federal officials, there is an even more compelling structural argument for
upgrading the previously applicable general common law to federal status
without awaiting action by Congress: leaving the existence of such remedies
to Congress can be expected to underprotect the constitutional limits on federal officials. As noted, the main job of federal officials is to enforce federal
law. For the most part, the federal law that federal officials enforce is the law
that Congress itself has enacted. To the extent the Constitution places limits
on the authority of federal officials, it fetters the ability of these officials to
enforce the statutes that Congress has enacted. The Court has recognized
that leaving the efficacy of the Constitution’s limits on congressional power
to Congress’s unmonitored discretion would “reduce[ ] [the Constitution] to
nothing.”52 It would leave the fox in charge of the henhouse. The same
concern tells us that leaving the question of remedies for constitutional viola48 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 539–40.
49 It is true that, in theory, state legislatures had the power to modify the general
common law. But the state legislatures’ power to alter the common-law remedies against
federal officials who violated the Constitution was largely unexercised and in any event, for
constitutional reasons, was far more limited than its power to revise the common law in
other respects. See id. at 536–37.
50 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515–16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress, however, has
remained silent—and conspicuously so, having resisted a sustained campaign by Government contractors to legislate for them some defense. The Court—unelected and unaccountable to the people—has unabashedly stepped into the breach to legislate a rule
denying [plaintiff’s] family the compensation that state law assures them.” (footnote
omitted)).
51 See, e.g., id. at 513 (majority opinion).
52 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
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tions to Congress is structurally problematic. As Justice Harlan recognized in
Bivens, “the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication
of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment.”53 The Founders did not leave it to Congress to establish damage remedies against federal officials. They understood that such remedies would be
available absent congressional action via the general common law, and Congress vested jurisdiction in the federal courts to enforce such remedies. Now
that we no longer recognize this in-between category of law, the constitutionally contemplated mechanism for giving efficacy to the Constitution should
be upgraded to federal-law status.
Despite Erie’s abolition of general common law, the Court has recognized a federal common-law immunity of federal officials from damage suits
for violations of the Constitution. Before the Westfall Act, this immunity
applied not just to Bivens actions but also to claims based on the common
law. As noted, the Court has defended this doctrine because of the special
federal interest involved.54 In the context of immunities from liability,
unlike in the Bivens context, the Court has not deferred to Congress’s superior role as the federal legislative branch.55 The Court’s disparate treatment
of its role in recognizing federal damage claims against federal officials and
its role in recognizing immunity from such claims (including common-law
claims)—deferring to Congress as to the first but not as to the second—is not
just inconsistent; it gets things backwards. If the Court had not recognized
an immunity of federal officials, Congress could be expected to enact such an
immunity, if it regarded it as desirable. After all, as noted, the job of federal
officials is to enforce the statutes that Congress enacts, and actions to enforce
the Constitution against federal officials fetter those officials’ ability to
enforce those statutes. For precisely the same reason, the constitutional
structure tells us that Congress will be disinclined to establish rights of action
that will fetter the ability of federal officials to enforce federal statutes. It is
no accident that Congress has yet to do so. If the propriety of federal common lawmaking turns on whether it is prudent to await congressional action,
the judiciary should defer to Congress regarding the recognition of a federal
common law of immunity for federal officials but not regarding the recognition of a federal damage remedy.
C.

Problems with the Ancien Régime

The ancien régime of common-law damage remedies for constitutional
violations was hardly a panacea. The Court in Bivens rightly noted that the
interests protected by the common law did not entirely overlap with the inter53 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he Bill of Rights is particularly
intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as
expressed in legislative majorities . . . .”).
54 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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ests protected by the Constitution.56 A federal damage remedy not linked to
the common law would be superior from this perspective. But, as Professor
Woolhandler has demonstrated, the federal courts in the pre-Erie era exhibited substantial independence from common-law precedents in molding the
damage remedy against government officials who violated the Constitution to
advance the federal interests involved.57 The U.S. government’s brief in Bivens extolled the common-law remedial regime because of the common law’s
flexibility. “[G]rowth and improvement ha[ve] always been the great tradition of the common law.”58 The common law itself contained the tools for
this evolution.59 Thus, if the Court had framed the Bivens remedy as the
post-Erie continuation of our long tradition of recognizing common-law damage remedies for violation of the Constitution, albeit as federal common law,
the Bivens majority’s concerns may well have been addressed over time, just
as the federal remedy for injunctive relief was gradually extricated from common-law constraints after the Ex parte Young decision.60
Another potential problem with the ancien régime, if Bivens had been
framed as merely upgrading it to federal-law status for the post-Erie era, is
that Congress can in theory repeal the remedy, as it can repeal all federal
common law. As noted, the ancien régime coexisted with Bivens for a number
of years, but the Westfall Act eventually preempted state remedies against
federal officials.61 As Professor Vladeck and I have explained, the Westfall
Act radically altered the nature of the Bivens question. Whereas the “special
factors” question before the Westfall Act was understood to be whether there
was a special reason for wanting the damage remedy to continue to be governed by state law, the “special factors” question after the Westfall Act was
posed as whether there should be any damage remedy at all.62 If the question is posed as federal vs. state law, then the fact that a case implicates
national security would be a reason to regard the remedy as federal rather
than state law. But if the question is posed as whether there should be any
remedy at all, then the prospect of judicial interference with foreign relations
56 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394 (“The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass
and the invasion of privacy, and those protected by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”).
57 See Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 110–11 (“[T]he federal courts in both law and
equity showed considerable independence as to procedures . . . and with respect to standing-to-sue and other elements of underlying causes of action.”).
58 Brief for Respondents, supra note 33, at *18.
59 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 538 (discussing the common law “action on
the statute” (quoting Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law
of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968)).
60 See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (“The ability
to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of
courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action,
tracing back to England.” (citing Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and
the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. Rev. 345 (1956))).
61 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
62 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 579.
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becomes a reason to deny a federal remedy. Changing the default regime
changes the nature of the question entirely.
Congress’s principal concern in enacting the Westfall Act was with common-law actions against federal officials that did not allege constitutional violations.63 Before the Westfall Act, individuals could sue federal officials on a
common-law theory for run-of-the-mill injuries, such as traffic accidents. The
Westfall Act specifically exempted suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution” from preemption.64 Professor Vladeck and I have argued that this
provision could have been construed to exempt common-law actions alleging
constitutional violations, thus retaining the ancien régime as an alternative to
Bivens.65 Instead, the Court has construed the exemption as covering only
Bivens actions and thus has interpreted the Westfall Act to preclude common-law remedies in contexts in which the Court has not recognized the
availability of Bivens remedies.66 If the Court had framed Bivens as the postErie federalization of the ancien régime, the remedies previously available
under the ancien régime would have been exempted from preemption under
the Westfall Act.
Even if the Court had construed the so-called Bivens exemption to preserve the preexisting common-law remedies for violation of the Constitution,
Congress might still have the power to preempt those remedies today. But
Congress’s decision to exempt Bivens actions shows that it is loath to do so,
perhaps believing (correctly) that the existence of damages for constitutional
violations is a matter to which the Constitution assigns the primary role to the
courts. For this reason, scholars have argued that the Westfall Act should be
read as legislative approval of the Bivens remedy.67 At a minimum, the
Westfall Act should be understood to preserve, as Bivens claims, the remedies
that were available against federal officials as common-law claims before the
Westfall Act. The House Report made clear that the Act was not intended to
affect the availability of remedies for constitutional violations.68 Thus, if the
Westfall Act is interpreted to preclude common-law remedies as such, it
should also be interpreted to preserve, as Bivens actions, whatever remedies
were previously available as common-law claims.69

63 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2018).
64 Id.
65 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 571.
66 See id at 571–72.
67 See id. at 514; James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 132–38 (2009).
68 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 6 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5950
(noting that the Act “would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek
personal redress from Federal employees who allegedly violate their Constitutional
rights”).
69 For elaboration of this argument, see Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 31, at 571.
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The Latent Constitutional Questions

If Congress did attempt to eliminate Bivens remedies, the courts would
have to confront the question whether the availability of damages for constitutional violations is constitutionally required. The fact that the “plan envisaged when the Bill of Rights was passed” was that a person injured by a
constitutional violation “may proceed . . . by a suit at common law . . . for
damages for the illegal act,” as Solicitor General Griswold told the Court in
Bivens, would support an argument that some level of damage relief is constitutionally required.70 There are, in addition, several lines of precedent
establishing that the Constitution requires damage remedies against government officials at least in certain circumstances.
For example, due process precedents establish that damages are constitutionally required when a government official intentionally deprives an individual of liberty or property in an unlawful manner.71 The Due Process
Clause usually requires a pre-deprivation hearing, but, in certain circumstances, the Due Process Clause is satisfied with a post-deprivation hearing.
For example, a post-deprivation hearing satisfies the Due Process Clause with
respect to taxes; because of its need for tax revenues, the state is permitted to
require taxpayers to pay first and challenge later.72 A post-deprivation hearing also satisfies the Due Process Clause when a state official has deprived
persons of liberty or property in a random and unauthorized way.73 When
the state relegates persons to a post-deprivation hearing, it must afford them
a meaningful post-deprivation remedy if the deprivation turns out to have
been unlawful—and, of course, one ground on which the deprivation might
be unlawful is if it violates the Constitution. There is a line of precedent
addressing which sorts of state remedies satisfy the Due Process Clause and
which do not. The Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not
require punitive damages,74 but does require monetary relief sufficient to
compensate the victim of the deprivation.75
Although most of these were suits under § 1983, the post-deprivation
remedy these precedents are referring to is based on the Due Process Clause,
not § 1983. The Court in these cases has held that the Due Process Clause is
satisfied, and thus no damages are available under § 1983, if the state has
70 Brief for Respondents, supra note 33, at *10 (quoting Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1817) (second alteration in original)); see also Ann Woolhandler &
Michael G. Collins, Was Bivens Necessary?, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2021); Martin H.
Redish, Constitutional Remedies as Constitutional Law 5 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of L. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 20-23, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3668518.
71 Cf. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
643 (1999); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127–30 (1990).
72 See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 37
(1990) (“[I]t is well established that a State need not provide predeprivation process for
the exaction of taxes.”).
73 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132.
74 See Fallon et al., supra note 4, at 1029–30.
75 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
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authorized by statute or otherwise an award of damages in its own courts that
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Thus, these precedents
establish that the Due Process Clause itself requires the remedy. Of course,
post-deprivation remedies satisfy the Due Process Clause only in those limited
circumstances in which the Due Process Clause does not require a pre-deprivation remedy. Thus, outside the context of taxes and random and unauthorized deprivations, the Due Process Clause is violated whether or not the state
provides post-deprivation remedies.76 When cases involving such deprivations have been brought under § 1983, the Court has held that a damage
remedy is available against state officials under § 1983 without regard to the
availability of post-deprivation remedies.77 Because § 1983 provides a remedy, the Court has not had to consider whether the Due Process Clause
requires a post-deprivation remedy against state officials in these circumstances. But the answer to that question is clear: if the Due Process Clause
requires states to provide a damage remedy in those limited circumstances in
which the Constitution does not require a pre-deprivation hearing (and the
deprivation turns out to have been unlawful), then a fortiori it requires a damage remedy in cases in which the state was required to provide a pre-deprivation hearing and did not do so.
In addition to the Due Process Clause, damage remedies might also be
required by the Supremacy Clause. As discussed above, the traditional mechanism for obtaining damages against federal (and state) officials who violated
the Constitution was to bring a common-law action, and the violation of the
Constitution served to negate any defense of official authority. In such
actions, the Supremacy Clause played a central role: because the Constitution
is the “supreme Law of the Land,”78 it nullifies any state statute that would
otherwise have justified the official’s action, leaving the official subject in his
person to whatever remedies would be available against any private party who
caused similar injuries.
If the [officer’s] act . . . be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer
. . . comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and
he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.79

This reasoning suggests that the function of the Supremacy Clause, with
respect to constitutional violations by government officials, is to place the
officer in the position of a private party under like circumstances. So understood, the Supremacy Clause supplies the textual constitutional basis for the
Founders’ understanding, as advanced by Solicitor General Griswold in Bivens, that common-law remedies would be available to safeguard constitutional
rights. As I have argued elsewhere, the Supremacy Clause would in some
respects be a narrower constitutional basis for a constitutionally required
76
77
78
79

See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138–39.
See id. at 138.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).
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damage remedy than the Due Process Clause, as the latter would require a
remedy for unlawful deprivations of liberty or property even if they do not
violate the Constitution, or even federal law.80
These constitutional questions have remained largely dormant because
of the recognition of a federal right of action in Bivens. They will arise again
if the Court declines to recognize a Bivens action in a context in which the
ancien régime would have provided a remedy, and no alternative damage remedy is available, such as under the Federal Tort Claims Act.81
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that the Court is wrong to claim that the fate of
Bivens should turn on the fate of the ancien régime for implying rights of
action under federal statutes. The nouveau régime for implied statutory remedies is based on the view that legislation reflects a compromise among competing interests and a statute’s omission of certain remedies likely reflects the
legislature’s belief that such remedies are unnecessary to give the statute efficacy or that the statute’s substantive provisions should have only limited efficacy. The Constitution’s omission of specific remedies for constitutional
violations, however, does not reflect either of these views. Rather, the Founders understood that victims of constitutional violations would have recourse
to common-law remedies.
Before Erie, this ancien régime of common-law remedies for constitutional
violations was understood to have the status of general common law, which
was neither state law nor federal law, but had an in-between status. After Erie
eliminated this in-between category, the courts assumed, without discussion,
that the common-law remedies had been downgraded to state-law status.
There were strong reasons for the Court to upgrade these remedies to federal-law status, but the Court in Bivens instead recognized a federal damage
remedy to supplement the common-law remedies. Subsequently, Congress
in the Westfall Act preempted state-law remedies, preserving only the Bivens
remedy against federal officials (along with FTCA remedies against the government itself).
The question whether the ancien régime of common-law remedies for
constitutional violations by federal officials should be regarded as having federal-common-law status remained moot as long as a broader Bivens remedy
remained available. But now, as the Court is cutting into Bivens’s core and
Congress has eliminated state-law remedies, the question of the post-Erie status of the ancien régime should be reconsidered. For a number of structural
constitutional reasons, and because the Founders understood this to be the
default regime for enforcing the Constitution, the Court should treat Bivens
80 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1777–85 (1997).
81 Cf. Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the federal official’s deprivation of plaintiff’s property did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause because plaintiff had an adequate remedy under the FTCA).
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as the post-Erie manifestation of the general common-law regime of remedies
for constitutional violations by federal officials. At a minimum, Bivens remedies should be available in circumstances in which remedies would have been
available, pre-Bivens, under a common-law theory. Indeed, this conclusion
may be constitutionally required.
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